

# WANO-MC safety improvement activities

global leadership in **nuclear safety**




# WANO

WORLD ASSOCIATION OF NUCLEAR OPERATORS

**M. Chudakov, WANO Moscow Centre, Moscow**

Ninth International Scientific and Technical Conference  
"Safety, Efficiency and Economics of Nuclear Power"  
Moscow, 21-23 May 2014

# WANO Organizational Chart



Region	Operating Units	Total capacity, MWe
North America	119	112060
Western Europe	118	113939
Asia – Far East	100	86848
Central and Eastern Europe	68	48528
Middle East and South Asia	25	6948
Latin America	6	4149
Africa	2	1860
<b>Total</b>	<b>438</b>	<b>374 332</b>

In 2013, WANO had **540** reactors, including operating reactors, reactors under construction and decommissioning, with **140** reactors affiliated to the Atlanta Center, **170** – Paris Center, **144** – Tokyo Center and **86** – Moscow Center.



## ❑ WANO members

❑ **35** countries

❑ **118** companies

❑ **210** NPPs

❑ **540** Units (operating Units, Units under construction and decommissioning)

## ● Nuclear industry changes

➔ **69** Units under construction

➔ **Over 50** nuclear entrants

# Plants under construction worldwide

Country	Units
China	28
Russia	10
India	6
The Republic of Korea	5
USA	5
Japan	2
Pakistan	2
Slovakia	2
United Arab Emirates	2
Other countries	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>69</b>

**In 2013, WANO Moscow Center had 71  
operating Units at 25 plants in 11 countries, with  
their total installed electrical power being over  
50 GWe.**

# WANO Moscow Centre

Country	Operating Units	Operating plants
Armenia	1	1
Bulgaria	2	1
Hungary	4	1
India	1	1
Iran	1	1
China	2	1
Russia	33	10
Slovakia	4	2
Ukraine	15	4
Finland	2	1
Czech Republic	6	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>25</b>



# 25 WANO-MC commercial plants in 11 countries

## **Russia** – 33 Units

1. Balakovo NPP - 4 Units
2. Beloyarsk NPP - 1 Unit
3. Bilibino NPP - 4 Units
4. Kalinin NPP - 4 Units
5. Kola NPP - 4 Units
6. Kursk NPP - 4 Units
7. Leningrad NPP - 4 Units
8. Novovoronezh NPP - 3 Units
9. Rostov NPP - 2 Units
10. Smolensk NPP - 3 Units

## **Ukraine** – 15 Units

11. Zaporozhye NPP - 6 Units
12. Rovno NPP - 4 Units
13. Khmelnytskyi NPP - 2 Units
14. South Ukraine NPP - 3 Units

## **Czech Republic** – 6 Units

15. Dukovany NPP - 4 Units
16. Temelin NPP - 2 Units

## **Slovakia** – 4 Units

17. Bohunice NPP - 2 Units
18. Mochovce NPP - 2 Units

## **Hungary**

19. Paks NPP - 4 Units

## **Bulgaria**

20. Kozloduy NPP - 2 Units

## **China**

21. Tianwan NPP - 2 Units

## **Finland**

22. Loviisa NPP - 2 Units

## **India**

23. Kudankulam NPP - 2 Units

*Unit 2 has not reached commercial operation stage as yet*

## **Armenia**

24. Armenian NPP - 1 Unit

## **Iran**

25. Bushehr NPP - 1 Unit

## 14 WANO–MC Units under construction in 2013:

- Akademik Lomonosov-1&2
- Beloyarsk NPP-4
- Baltic NPP-1
- Leningrad NPP-2-1
- Leningrad NPP-2-2
- Mochovce NPP-3, 4
- Novovoronezh NPP-2-1
- Novovoronezh NPP-2-2
- Rostov NPP-3, 4
- Tianwan NPP-3, 4

**WANO has four main programs in place to support its members:**

- 1. Operating experience (OE) program**
- 2. Peer review program**
- 3. Professional and technical development (P&TD) program**
- 4. Technical support and exchange (TS&E) program**

# OE program

## Objectives:


- ☐ To ensure information exchange among WANO members on plant events and event analysis
- ☐ To focus WANO members' attention on events to take preventive actions
- ☐ Use of operating experience is a proved method of enhancing operational safety through learning lessons from events



# SOER

## Significant Operating Experience Reports

- ❑ SOER – Addressed to WANO members to get them familiar with significant events or trends and recommendations whereby WANO members shall identify and implement corrective actions to prevent recurrence
- ❑ In addition to the detailed analysis, the reports include the following:
  - ❑ Summary
  - ❑ Training materials
  - ❑ Training presentations
  - ❑ Recommendations
- ❑ 17 SOERs have been issued since 1998





# SER


## Significant Event Reports

- ❑ SER – encompasses a significant event analysis and exchange of lessons learned
- ❑ SERs contain the following:
  - ❑ Event description
  - ❑ Causes
  - ❑ Analysis
  - ❑ Lessons learned
  - ❑ Preventive actions
- ❑ Training presentations attached
- ❑ 38 WANO SERs have been issued since 1999



# Just-In-Time OE Reports

- ❑ JIT – to be used by managers to get their staff prepared for possible errors
  - ❑ Each JIT contains 3-4 event analyses
  - ❑ Cause analysis
  - ❑ Questions that give the staff an idea of actions to prevent an event
- ❑ JITs are intended to be used as pre-job briefings

IIR 125 Rev 2 September 2008		<h1>Just-In-Time Operating Experience</h1> <h2>Turbine Valve Testing</h2>
<h3>Errors while performing or restoring from turbine valve testing have caused significant plant transients and a steam release into the turbine building</h3>		
<h4>Events:</h4>		
<p>Turbine Island Trip Caused by the Start of Reheat Bleed of MCR 1A – Reference: <a href="#">PAR-TTO-06-001</a></p> <p>While reactor power reduced to 40% for turbine valve testing in November 2007, an operator incorrectly closed a second low-pressure turbine stop valve rather than opening the valve and this partially closed the steam. The closure of the low-pressure turbine stop valve caused a rapid response to decrease reactor power and this resulted in the tripping of the automatic emergency shutdown system. Operators corrected the reaction and manually stopped the turbine. Although a considerable amount of steam was released to the turbine building, no core was exposed.</p>		
<p><b>Impacts:</b></p> <p><b>Contributors:</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The operator inadvertently turned the wrong switch.</li> <li>The test switches were not arranged in a manner that supports error-free operation.</li> <li>The test switches were not clearly labelled.</li> <li>The test procedures did not require a signature or verification that testing was complete for one valve prior to beginning testing of the next valve.</li> <li>Backup control or barriers were not used to prevent manipulating the wrong switch.</li> </ul>	
<p>Reactor: <a href="#">Glascoombe Island</a> (United Kingdom – IRE) – Construction (Representing)</p> <p>Reactor: <a href="#">Glascoombe Island</a> (United Kingdom – IRE) – Construction (Representing)</p> <p>Reactor: <a href="#">Glascoombe Island</a> (United Kingdom – IRE) – Construction (Representing)</p> <p>While reactor power reduced to 40% for turbine valve testing in December 2007, operators incorrectly adjusted steam turbine load to reduce reactor turbine output and this resulted in an unexpected error. Operators had an erroneous assumption that turbine load would be reduced to 40% and this resulted in a decrease in the automatic emergency shutdown system. Adjusting reactor power based on an inappropriate indication resulted in reactor power increasing above safe levels. Additional monitoring capabilities, including those activities, were required to ensure reactor power remained at safe levels.</p>		
<p><b>Impacts:</b></p> <p><b>Contributors:</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The appropriate reactor power parameters were not identified and monitored prior to the incident, which resulted in reactor thermal power limits being exceeded.</li> <li>Operators made an inappropriate decision to perform concurrent activities while approaching full power.</li> <li>Work responsibility overlap including reactor briefing in the control room allowed the power to surge.</li> <li>Procedures did not contain a limitation regarding how fast power can be raised when approaching full power.</li> <li>Workload existed with the preparation and use of reactor plans.</li> </ul>	
<p>Reactor: <a href="#">Glascoombe Island</a> (United Kingdom – IRE) – Construction (Representing)</p> <p>Reactor: <a href="#">Glascoombe Island</a> (United Kingdom – IRE) – Construction (Representing)</p> <p>Reactor: <a href="#">Glascoombe Island</a> (United Kingdom – IRE) – Construction (Representing)</p> <p>Operator error during restoration from turbine valve testing, generator, steam and turbine valve testing resulted in a significant plant transient in April 2008. While restoring the turbine power from the grid, the operator mistakenly opened a stop valve rather than closed valve. This resulted in the turbine generator turbine building closed and a full turbine load reduction. The turbine load reduction caused some steam flow pressure in turbine until the turbine steam stop valve opened, followed by a rapid pressure decrease. The operator recognized the issue of the steam and</p>		

# OE program

In total, WANO-MC received **102** event reports from 71 operating Units in 2012, with each Unit sending at least one report.

The year 2013 saw **176** event reports.

**There are no longer “silent” Units in the WANO Moscow Center.**

## Objectives:

- ☐ To compare the operational level of a plant against WANO standards through an in-depth analysis of the plant performance by a WANO international independent peer review team
- ☐ To identify plant opportunities to fulfill performance objectives at a higher quality level: Can each specific job be done better?



## **Main peer reviews (PR):**

- 1. Full-scale PRs**
- 2. Pre-start-up PRs**
- 3. Corporate PRs**
- 4. Follow-up PRs**



# Peer review program (new PO&C)

## Fundamental review areas:

- ☐ Nuclear professionals
- ☐ Leadership

## Functional review areas:

- ☐ Operation
- ☐ Maintenance
- ☐ Chemistry
- ☐ Engineering support
- ☐ Radiation protection
- ☐ Training



Each peer review involves peers from other WANO Regional Centers

## Cross-functional review areas:

- ☐ Overriding operational targets (“operational focus”)
- ☐ Work management
- ☐ Equipment reliability
- ☐ NPP (design condition) configuration management
- ☐ Radiation safety
- ☐ Performance improvement
- ☐ Operating experience
- ☐ Organizational structure efficiency
- ☐ Fire protection
- ☐ Emergency preparedness



- ❑ Since 2012, preliminary visits (**pre-visits**) have been arranged prior to each full-scale peer review.
- ❑ To follow the WANO-MC long-term plan and Post-Fukushima Commission recommendations, all WANO-MC plants will switch over to **4-year** cycle peer reviews by 2015.
- ❑ Pre-start-up peer reviews shall be carried out by a WANO team **prior to plant operation** to evaluate its preparedness for safe operation.
- ❑ All utilities shall undergo corporate peer reviews before **31.12.2017**.



# Corporate Peer Reviews

Plant safety largely depends on the interaction between the plant and utility

- How the utility sets concepts, tasks and objectives
- How the utility provides resources, including human and financial resources, technical support, etc.
- How the utility ensures nuclear safety oversight




Corporate peer reviews give a critical judgment of the interactions and their impact on plant operational quality and reliability.

# Pre-start-up Peer Reviews

- ❑ Overview of all necessary factors to start safe plant operation.
- ❑ Inclusion of the plant into the international nuclear society, establishment of interactions.
- ❑ Support to the plant under construction to ensure a high quality of installation and further operation.








# Professional and technical development


## Components:

- ☐ Workshops and conferences
- ☐ Training
- ☐ Information dissemination



**Technical support and exchange program** encompasses the following activities:

- ☐ Technical support missions
- ☐ Performance indicators
- ☐ Guidelines and good practices



## Technical support missions

- ☐ Technical support missions aim to support WANO members in finding better ways of addressing performance issues, enhancing safety and reliability. These missions are conducted on a voluntary basis, when requested by the customer – plant
- ☐ Duration ranges from two days to two weeks
- ☐ Various plant issues are areas of focus during these missions




## Technical support missions

- 1) Expert (exchange of information and world best practices)
- 2) Review of plant specific performance areas (assist visits)
- 3) Training
- 4) Experience exchange visits (benchmarking)



# Technical support missions



### ☐ Performance indicators


- ☐ Illustrate another method of supporting plants to compare their performance indicators against those of other plants and to identify areas for improving plant operation
- ☐ Indicators are also used to identify advanced industry-wide companies to exchange good practices or to prepare for WANO peer reviews



# WANO: 12 performance indicators falling into 4 categories

1. Коэффициент готовности энергоблока  
*UCF – Unit Capability Factor*
2. Коэффициент неготовности энергоблока  
*UCLF – Unplanned Capability Loss Factor*
3. Коэффициент вынужденных потерь электроэнергии  
*FLR – Forced Loss Rate*
4. Непланные автоматические аварийные остановки реактора в критическом состоянии  
*UA7 – Unplanned Automatic Scrams per 7,000 Hours Critical*
5. Непланные аварийные остановки реактора в крит. сост. (автоматическое + ручное)  
*US7 – Unplanned Scrams per 7,000 Hours Critical (automatic + manual)*
6. Коэффициент недовыработки по причинам, связанным с работой энергосистемы  
*GRLF – Grid Related Loss Factor*
7. Работоспособность систем безопасности (CAOЗ ВД, САПВ, Авар.ЭС)  
*SSPI - Safety System Performance (SP1, SP2, SP5 – EAC)*
8. Коллективная доза радиационного облучения  
*CRE – Collective Radiation Exposure*
9. Показатель надежности ядерного топлива  
*FRI – Fuel Reliability*
10. Химический показатель  
*CPI – Chemistry Performance Indicator*
11. Показатель потерь рабочего времени в результате несчастных случаев персонала АЭС  
*ISA – Industrial Safety Accident Rate*
12. Показатель несчастных случаев у персонала подрядных организаций  
*CISA – Contractor Industrial Safety Accident Rate*

## Production



## SS reliability

## Radiation, fuel, chemistry

## Personnel safety

The WANO Post-Fukushima Commission established in April 2011 in response to the Fukushima event was charged with determining the changes WANO should implement based on the lessons learned from the event to help prevent or mitigate a similar occurrence in the future, and to close the gaps in WANO performance.

**Mr. Mitchell, Chairman of the Post-Fukushima Commission,  
Ontario Power CNO  
2011 BGM**





*...nuclear industry had changed unalterably, and to go forward, WANO must be much stronger and have “teeth” with its members. ... if this could not be accomplished, WANO should close its doors and relinquish the role of champion and proponent of international nuclear safety.*

**WANO Post-Fukushima Commission formulated 5 recommendations**

- 1 To extend the scope of WANO to design and accident management**
- 2 To set up an event response strategy**
- 3 To increase WANO credibility (stronger internal control)**
- 4 To increase WANO transparency (WANO regular reports accessible to public)**
- 5 To increase internal consistency between the 4 Regional Centers**

## WANO Post-Fukushima Commission projects to respond to post-Fukushima actions:

Project	STATUS
1. Self-assessment (LO)	Completed*
2. Emergency planning (AC)	Completed
3. Severe accident management (MC)	Completed
4. On-site fuel storage (TC)	Completed**
5. Emergency response planning (LO)	In progress
6. Design bases (PC)	In progress
7. Corporate peer reviews (LO)	Completed
8. Equivalency of other organizations' peer reviews (LO)	Completed
9. Early notification strategy (LO)	Completed
10. Visibility and transparency (LO)	In progress
11. Increasing frequency of WANO peer reviews (LO)	Completed
12. Assessment process (LO)	In progress

\*Self-assessment is completed, follow-up self-assessment is under way

\*\*SOER is developed, implementation of recommendations is initiated

## WANO-MC support

- Dissemination of OE materials, including SER, SOER, JIT
- Familiarization with good practices of other plants
- Dissemination of WANO guidelines
- Technical support missions
- Benchmarking visits
- Topical workshops, meetings and training courses
- Requests for additional information to address problematic areas to other plants and Regional Centers
- Participation in plant self-assessments
- Assist visits




# Performance monitoring

## Interaction categories


WANO has established its representative offices practically at all WANO-MC sites.

**WANO-MC on-site representative**



**Five interaction categories (A B C D and E)**  
have been proposed

# On-site Representative Offices. 09. 2012





# On-site Representative Offices. 2014



## WANO Post-Fukushima Commission:



*The full focus of WANO since its formation has been accident prevention, and no procedures were in place to address nuclear response or mitigation*

Therefore, WANO should both focus on accident prevention and mitigation, and should not confine itself with the accident prevention only



- One of the Post-Fukushima Commission recommendations was to extend the scope of WANO programs, including, inter-alia, **severe accident management (SAM)**
- WANO-MC assumed overall responsibility for the SAM project to complete the project on December 26, 2012


- It is recommended that all plants should undertake a SAM self-assessment by **late 2015**
- PO&C in SAM and “How to review SAM” guideline which WANO developed and submitted to the utilities/plants make up the basis for the self-assessment



- ❑ Another WANO Post-Fukushima Commission recommendation is to: **Develop an international event response strategy**
- ❑ On August 30, 2011, the WANO-MC plant stress test workshop decided to establish a VVER Regional Crisis Center (RCC) to render assistance in the decision making process in case of severe accidents

# RCC tasks and objectives

- ❑ Support to affected plants
- ❑ Dissemination of information on plant safety significant events among the RCC members
- ❑ Establishment of the single information and expert space





**Principle 1: Continuous readiness**

**Principle 2: Optimization of information flows**

**Principle 3: Early notification**

**Principle 4: Confidentiality**

**Principle 5: Expert support**

**Principle 6: Logistical support**

**Principle 7: Use of accumulated knowledge**

**Principle 8: Exercises and drills**

**Principle 9: Voluntariness**

# RCC participation levels

**Level 1**

**Level 2**

**Level 3**

**Participants: all 11 WANO-MC operating organizations**

**Level 1**      **Finland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Ukraine, Bulgaria**

**Level 2**      **Iran, China**

**Level 3**      **Russia, Armenia**

**No decision**      **India**

# Regional Crisis Center (RCC)

- ❑ RCC started on **14 March 2013**.
- ❑ RCC agreements were concluded with nine WANO-MC utilities.
- ❑ RCC regulations... were approved by the WANO-MC Governing Board in October 2012.
- ❑ RCC regulations on information exchange between the RCC and VVER RCC members and procedure for RCC operation were developed.
- ❑ RCC participated in the international integrated emergency exercises with a simulated initiating event at:
  - ✓ Loviisa NPP on 14 March 2013 (Finland)
  - ✓ Kalinin NPP on 18-20 September 2013



- Conclusion of RCC agreements with Slovenske Elektrarne (Slovakia) and Kudankulam NPP (India).
- RCC participation in 3 emergency exercises at Kola NPP, Mochovce NPP and Kozloduy NPP.
- Accumulation of RCC operating experience and increase of OO/NPP participation level in the RCC.
- Sharing information within the RCC framework per RCC regulations and information exchange regulations.
- Other efforts per RCC 2014 Action Plan.



Спасибо за внимание!  
Thank You for Your Attention!